Role of Lawyers in the Fight against Money Laundering: Is a Reporting Requirement Appropriate, The;Legislative Reform by Abendano, Katrina R.
Journal of Legislation
Volume 27 | Issue 2 Article 9
5-1-2001
Role of Lawyers in the Fight against Money
Laundering: Is a Reporting Requirement
Appropriate, The;Legislative Reform
Katrina R. Abendano
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Legislative Reform is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Journal of Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Abendano, Katrina R. (2001) "Role of Lawyers in the Fight against Money Laundering: Is a Reporting Requirement Appropriate,
The;Legislative Reform," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 27: Iss. 2, Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol27/iss2/9
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The Role of Lawyers in the Fight Against Money
Laundering: Is a Reporting Requirement Appropriate?
I. INTRODUCTION
Money launderers seek to legitimize the proceeds of crime through transactions in-
volving the least amount of inspection while affording a minimal risk of detection.1 The
Financial Action Task Force, a policy-making body that promotes international stan-
dards against money laundering, recommends that institutions involved in the transfer of
funds be allowed to inquire into clients' activities notwithstanding the compromise to
financial privacy. 2 For example, a Colombian cartel systematically used money trans-
mitters in metropolitan New York to convert drug sale proceeds until authorities regu-
lated the sector. 3 The Treasury Department responded by authorizing the financial insti-
tutions in the immediate area to report transactions in excess of a specified amount.
4
Since the release of the Financial Action Task Force's Forty Recommendations against
money laundering in the mid-1990s, numerous signatory jurisdictions are required to
impose reporting requirements upon the financial industry as part of their larger anti-
money laundering programs. 5 Like other criminals wishing to exploit available opportu-
nities, money launderers reacted to the regulations by moving away from the financial
industry and shifting toward less-supervised businesses that assist in moving funds.
Professional services that were not traditionally used in money laundering are more
widely pursued as the sophistication of the criminal activity developed. In particular,
lawyers are among those identified as preferred agents for laundering illegally obtained
money.
6
The modern trend in money laundering finds criminals engaging lawyers as profes-
1. See Julia Randell Khan & Karen Conolly, Money Laundering: Updating Your Procedures, XI
PRAC. L. COMPANIES at 29, 30 (2000). Money laundering involves the placement of funds by entering into a
transaction to dispose of cash, layering the money in numerous transactions to hide the paper trail and integrat-
ing the proceeds into the financial stream as ordinary funds.
2. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, The Forty Recommendations (1990),
available at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/4ORecs-en.htm (last modified Nov. 7, 2000) (establishing guidelines to
assist governments in implementing anti-money laundering laws).
3. See Bruce Zagaris, Money Laundering and Bank Secrecy: U.S. Enacts Anti-Money Laundering
Act, 14 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., Dec. 1998, at 1, available in LEXIS, Secondary Legal/Legal News.
4. See id.
5. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, supra note 2.
6. See Bruce Zagaris, Avoiding Criminal Liability in the Conduct of International Business, 21WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 749, 809 (1996).
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sional intermediaries for converting funds derived from illicit activities7 due to the air of
legitimacy provided by their services. Although government agencies in the United
States have established effective measures to fight the money laundering phenomenon
that occurs through the financial sector, the use of non-financial institutions by money
launderers warrants further regulation. Legal professionals who handle client funds and
assist in financial and investment business are especially susceptible to potential liability
for money laundering. It now appears that procedural safeguards are necessary if law-
yers are to maintain a high level of professional responsibility while continuing to pro-
vide effective representation.
Section II of this Note provides an overview of U.S. regulations designed to combat
money laundering, with particular emphasis on the provisions applicable to lawyers.
Section III presents the European perspective on the money laundering problem. An
analysis of the United Kingdom's implementation of European Community legislation
involving lawyers and non-financial institutions allows for a comparison with U.S. laws.
Section IV raises potential ramifications upon the legal profession in the U.S. if legisla-
tion similar to proposed E.C. laws is considered in the future. Finally, some recommen-
dations for establishing money laundering countermeasures are presented in Section V.
H. U.S. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS
The United States' anti-money laundering regime consists of several pieces of legis-
lation designed to coordinate the efforts of government agencies and industries touched
by the problem while attacking the steps taken to disguise tainted funds.8
Although the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) may be
considered the precursor to anti-money laundering legislation criminalizing activities
involving interstate commerce, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 first instituted a duty upon
financial institutions to report transactions involving more than $10,000. 9 Submitted in
the form of currency transaction reports (CTRs), 10 the purpose behind detailing large
financial transactions is to retain records that may be helpful in the event of a regulatory
or criminal investigation. The financial industry practice of filing CTRs generated
shrewd responses from those involved in money laundering. First, money launderers
easily circumvented the CTRs filed by banks and other financial organizations through a
practice called "smurfing" which entails breaking large sums of money into smaller
amounts and entering numerous transactions." Others simply avoided those particular
7. See Stephen Gentle & Christopher Murray, Handling Funds, in ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
GUIDE 5660-61 (Barry AK. Rider & Dr. Chizu V. Nakajima eds., 2000).
8. See Wilmer Parker III, United States, in ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING GUIDE 85101-104 (Barry
A.K. Rider & Dr. Chizu V. Nakajima eds., 2000).
9. See id. at 85101, 85404.
10. See id. at 85404.
11. See Jimmy Gurule, The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creating a New Federal Of-
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institutions required to file CTRs and sought alternative means of converting illicit
money into legitimate funds.
To catch transactions entered to launder dirty money through non-financial institu-
tions, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requires anyone who receives $10,000 or more
in the course of business dealings to return a Form 8300 with details of the client's iden-
tity, and the amount and the nature of the transaction.' 2 Under the Internal Revenue
Code, lawyers and other non-financial businesses must provide the IRS with a report
similar to a CTR that the authorities may access in the event that money laundering is
suspected. Failure to provide the required information may result in civil or criminal
penalties.13 Lawyers handling financial matters or investment business on behalf of their
clients must therefore be cognizant not only of their reporting obligations but of their
potential liabilities under such regulation. However, lawyers have been known to avoid
reporting on the basis that it violates attorney-client confidentiality14 and to 'look the
other way' when acting in their legal capacity.
In 1986, Congress criminalized the intentional transfer or movement of tainted
funds under the Money Laundering Control Act.15 The legislation broadly encompasses
activities associated with money laundering and consists of two regulations devised to
confront distinct but related pursuits. On the one hand, section 1956 deals with transac-
tions entered specifically with the intention of furthering illegal activities, with the
knowledge that the funds involved were criminally obtained.' 6 On the other hand, sec-
tion 1957 is designed to catch those who enter transactions to protect illicit funds from
detection, despite a lack of intent to promote criminal activity.' 7 According to section
1957, anyone who participates in a financial transaction greater than $10,000 in value
and knows that the funds are tainted, despite lacking the intention to further criminal
activity, may be fined or imprisoned.' 8 Under section 1957, lawyers who handle funds
on behalf of a client when assisting in a financial matter may be liable if they are aware
that their client gained the money through criminal means. Although lawyers are not
exempt from liability under the Money Laundering Control Act, the professional bar
association provides little guidance as to the responsibilities of lawyers under this law.
Perhaps this inattention stems from the doubt expressed by those responsible for drafting
fense or Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors and Alternative Means of Punishing Specified Unlawful Activ-
ity?, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 823, 825 (1995).
12. See I.R.C. § 60501 (2000).
13. See id.
14. See Wendy Shuck, The Impact of Anti-Money Laundering Laws on Attorney-Client Privilege, 19
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L. L. REV. 507, 516 (1996).
15. Money Laundering Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § § 1956-57 (1988)) [hereinafter Money Laundering Control Act].
16. See Gurule, supra note 11, at 826-27.
17. See Parker, supra note 8, at 85,402.
18. See Money Laundering Control Act, supra note 15. See also Paul G. Wolfteich, Making Criminal
Defense a Crime Under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, 41 VAND. L. REV. 843 (1988) (explaining the scope and state of
mind required for liability under Section 1957).
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the legislation that it would result in much prosecution of lawyers for involvement in
money laundering while acting in their legal capacity. 19 A problematic result of the
knowledge requirement under section 1957 is that it discourages lawyers from inquiring
about the source of their clients' funds in order to escape criminal responsibility.
Government regulators recognized that further action by the financial industry was
necessary to supplement the practice of filing CTRs. As a result, Congress passed a
crucial amendment to the Money Laundering Control Act in 1994 in which it further
required financial institutions and their employees to report on suspicious transactions. 20
Suspicious activity reports (SARs) under 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) play a key position in the
US system against money laundering 2' and are currently filed by a number of organiza-
tions including banks, holding companies, credit unions, and money remitters.22 Thus, in
addition to CTRs which are submitted on the basis of meeting a threshold minimum
value, the use of subjective judgment is also authorized by the measures formulated
against money laundering. A SAR must provide detailed information regarding the cli-
ent, the nature and amount of the transaction, the employees involved in the transaction
and an explanation of the unusual nature of the transaction. 23 Coupled with the require-
ment of filing a SAR is the prohibition on financial institutions and their employees
from notifying the client who is the subject of suspicion.24 The Treasury Department's
Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has tracked and measured the utility
of SARs since 1996.5 According to the American Bankers Association, SARs have
played an important role not only in! calling attention to the incidence of financial crimes
but also in identifying geographical areas where such activity is concentrated.2 6 It ap-
pears that despite the problem potentially raised by using subjective criteria in deciding
whether or not to file a SAR, the reporting method is now routine procedure among
federally regulated financial institutions.
More recently, the Federal Reserve Board proposed "know your customer" regula-
tions to supplement the existing regime.27 Aimed at banking institutions, the "know your
19. See Wolfteich, supra note 18, at 849.
20. See Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2254
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (1995)).
21. See id.
22. See Matthew R. Hall, An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct: Banks, Money Launder-
ing, and the Suspicious Activity Report, 84 KY. L. J. 643,656 (1995).
23. See id. at 656-67.
24. See FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, The SAR Ac-
tivity Review - Trends, Tips and Issues, 28 (October 2000), available at http://www.treas.gov/fincen (last
modified Feb. 22, 2001) [hereinafter SAR Activity Review].
25. See id. at 2.
26. See id. at 14.
27. See US: Proposed 'Know Your Customer' Rules Withdrawn, MONEY LAUNDERING MONITOR
(CCH, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London, England) April 1999, at 7 available at
http://www.cchnewlaw.co.uk (last visited Feb. 22, 2001).
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customer" regulations would have extended reporting procedures already in force by
calling for the verification of clients' identities and recording of patterns of transactions.
The proposal, however, was withdrawn as a result of criticism both from private parties
and the financial sector. 8 Opponents of the proposal claimed that imposing additional
rules would place an undue burden on banks and more importantly, would invade the
privacy of clients.29 Despite the failure to enact "know your customer" rules, the finan-
cial industry continues to subscribe to established procedures for reporting large transac-
tions and suspicious activities that provide audit trails if necessary. The failure of the
Federal Reserve Board's proposed measure to gain approval may signal that while fur-
ther regulation is necessary, the sectors calling for such legislation are those experienc-
ing increased activity as a result of the shift in the money laundering trend.
Given the way in which money laundering has branched out beyond the traditional
sectors, it appears that U.S. measures are not sufficiently comprehensive although they
assigns liability to a broad range of participants in the crime. Regulation of the financial
industry has been instrumental in identifying atypical activities and for prosecuting
money launderers.30 However, the activity of moving illegitimate funds continues to be
a pervasive problem since its pursuit has been redirected through other avenues. Today,
placement of illicit funds is done with the help of professional intermediaries and other
non-banking financial institutions. While the U.S. has created sound and effective meas-
ures thus far, placing obligations similar to those imposed on the financial industry upon
professionals who provide services related to the transfer of property or funds must be
considered. In particular, lawyers are vulnerable when handling investment deals, prop-
erty transfers and other financial matters for clients due to the confidentiality that cloaks
their services. Although Congressional action in this arena may prove to be problematic,
the legal profession might benefit from the institution of guidelines designed to identify,
handle and prevent potential abuse of legal services by money launderers. The legal
community is predictably bound to strongly oppose the imposition of reporting require-
ments upon the profession. However, doing so may grant lawyers a safe harbor against
liability while counteracting conscious avoidance by those in the profession.
Foreign jurisdictions have recognized the need to strengthen reporting requirements
by non-financial institutions and businesses that are likely conduits for money launder-
ing. A comparison of the U.S. anti-money laundering regime with that of the United
Kingdom seems to confirm that lawyers have an additional professional obligation and
interest in taking part in the fight against money laundering.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See SAR Activity Review, supra note 24, at 14, 16, 19-22.
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III. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNITED KINGDOM MONEY LAUNDERING LAWS
The European Community, formed to promote freedom of access between member
states and increased competitiveness as a unit, recognized that the principle of free
movement also allows those in organized crime greater opportunity to legitimize tainted
funds. 31 Thus, the European Community needed protection against the increased flow of
financial crime generated by the single market. In 1991, the European Commission is-
sued Directive 91/308/EEC to simultaneously advance the integration of a single market
and to counteract money laundering.32 The Directive made money laundering connected
with drug activities an offense and imposed an obligation upon the financial sector to
adopt the practice of knowing its customers. 33 In addition, the Directive instituted the
practice of reporting suspicious activity by authorizing the relaxation of banking secrecy
rules when warranted. 34 The European Community acted immediately in order to pre-
empt the member states from implementing their own national regulations against
money laundering that might have been incompatible with the goals of the Community
as a whole.35 As an alternative, E.C. member states are bound to implement the Money
Laundering Directive but retain the discretion to expand its scope as long as its goals are
advanced.36
Regulations criminalizing money laundering were in effect in the United Kingdom
prior to the enactment of the European Community's Money Laundering Directive. In
particular, the scope with which the U.K. implemented the Directive is a useful refer-
ence for potential formulation of U.S. laws regarding the use of non-financial institu-
tions for money laundering. 37 In order to implement the E.C. Money Laundering Direc-
tive, the U.K. revised its Criminal Justice Act of 1993 (CJA) and enacted the Money
Laundering Regulations of 1993 (the Regulations). 38 The CJA previously criminalized
31. See FATF- VIII Annual Report 12-13 (June 19, 1997), available at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/Ctry-
orgpages/ctry-uk-en.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2001).
32. See Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial sys-
tem for the purpose of money laundering, Official Journal No. L166, at 77. [hereinafter Money Laundering
Directive]. See also European Parliament and Council Directive amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, COM (99) 532 final, avail-
able at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/comdatl 999/en_599PC0352.html (modified daily).
33. See id.
34. See Commission Proposal for Amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on the prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, 7 (July 1999), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/conpdf/1999/en_599PC0352.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2001).
35. See WILLIAM C. GILMORE, THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING COUNTERMEASURES, 156
(2d ed. 1999).
36. See Money Laundering Directive, supra note 32.
37. The United Kingdom acceded by treaty to the European Community and incorporated the Euro-
pean Economic Community Treaty into UK law through an act of Parliament called the European Communi-
ties Act of 1972. See generally Europa, The History of the European Union: A Chronology from 1946 to 2000,
available at http://www.europa.eu.intlabc/history/index-en.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2000).
38. See Criminal Justice Act, 1993, ch. 36 (Eng.)[hereinafter Criminal Justice Act]. See also Money
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money laundering related to drug activity before the issue of the Directive and Parlia-
ment later extended the law to cover all serious crimes, terrorist acts and drug traffick-
ing.39 Together, the CJA and the Regulations work to fight money laundering from op-
posite ends. While the CJA penalizes the offense of money laundering itself, the Regula-
tions are comprised of preventive measures designed to identify illegal activities before
they reach the criminal investigative stages.4a
Unlike their U.S. counterpart, the procedures under the 1993 Regulations are com-
prehensive because they cover most business entities that are vulnerable to money laun-
dering. The Regulations impose identical reporting and record-keeping obligations upon
both financial institutions and certain non-financial intermediaries that carry out "finan-
cial business." '' Thus, financial service providers such as credit institutions, insurance
businesses, notaries public, financial advisers, accountants, and solicitors are all required
to comply with the identification and reporting procedures.4a The Regulations therefore
require legal professionals to verify the identity of new clients thoroughly by requesting
that they furnish sufficient identification information.4 3 Similar to the threshold for
CTRs filed by financial institutions in the U.S., client identification is necessary for
individual transactions involving more than £10,000 or when a number of different
transactions that appear connected add up to more than £10,000.44 Rather than submit-
ting reports directly to government agencies, solicitors and other professionals upon
whom the Regulations apply in the U.K. must implement an in-house system for re-
cording suspicious transactions that must be kept for five years from the date of a trans-
action.45 For example, a solicitors' firm must appoint an officer to supervise internal
reporting procedures and act as a liaison with the Economic Crime Unit of the National
Crime Intelligence Service if further investigation ensues.4 6
Although the U.K.'s Regulations applicable to solicitors have been in force for a
number of years, the incorporation of the procedures into standard practice has been
slow.4 7 Solicitors in the U.K. may not be unaware of the laws but are rather mindful not
Laundering Regulations, 1993 (SI 1993/1933) (Eng.)[hereinafter Money Laundering Regulations]. See gener-
ally THE LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, THE GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF
SOLICITORS, 337-340 (Nicola Taylor, ed. 8th ed. 1999) (annotating UK legislation with practice notes for
solicitors and barristers).
39. See Gautam Bhattacharya and Emma Radmore, Fighting Money Laundering - A United King-
dom Perspective, in MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 101 (Barry Rider and Michael Ashe, eds. 1996).
40. See Khan & Conolly, supra note 1, at 29.
41. Money Laundering Regulations, supra note 38, Section 4(1).
42. See GILMORE, supra note 35, at 159.
43. See Khan & Conolly, supra note 1, at 35.
44. See id. at 32-33.
45. See id. at 35.
46. See Money Laundering Regulations, supra note 38, Section 5.
47. See UK: Importance of In-House Systems and Training Stressed, MONEY LAUNDERING
MONITOR: KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS (CCH, Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies, London, England) April 2000, at 6, available at http://www.cchnewlaw.co.uk (last
visited Feb. 22, 2001).
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to compromise their duties to clients. In order to raise awareness of the money launder-
ing provisions within the legal community, the Law Society of England and Wales for-
mulated guidelines to explain solicitors' obligations in accordance with the current leg-
islation.4 8 Solicitors may be deemed liable for participating in money laundering in a
number of ways under the U.K. laws. According to the Law Society, solicitors may be
liable for assisting a client in disguising criminally-obtained funds, for warning a client
who is the subject of a potential criminal investigation, for concealing one's suspicion or
knowledge of money laundering activities or for failing to alert the authorities of such
activities. 49 As a consequence, solicitors who fail to report knowledge or suspicion of
money laundering possibly face a fine or imprisonment.5 ° While solicitors in the U.K.
appear bound by a duty to report irregular dealings with clients, the lack of in-house
training on the subject at solicitors' firms demonstrates that legal professionals have
remained reluctant to divulge information regarding clients. Reporting one's suspicion
that a client may be engaging legal services in order to legitimize tainted funds is incon-
gruous with the entrenched principle of client confidentiality. However, compliance
with the reporting regulations is highly encouraged because it provides solicitors with an
escape from the likelihood of prosecution. 5' Rather than perceiving U.K. legislation as
imposing a duty to report, however, it may be characterized .as promoting a "culture of
defensive reporting" within the legal community.
52
The legitimacy of placing additional responsibility upon lawyers due to the role
they play as an intermediary in money laundering is not only recognized in the U.K.
Following the U.K. standards, the European Commission proposed amendments to the
Money Laundering Directive in response to the current trend in money laundering. 5
Money laundering offenses in the Community will no longer be confined to drug-related
activities but will include all organized crime.54 Like the broad U.K. regulations in
place, the Directive will be expanded to cover non-financial activities and professionals
whose services are employed by those who wish to disguise illicit funds. Some of the
alternative services that are now being used for converting dirty money include currency
exchange bureaus, casinos, lawyers, real estate agents, and auditors.55 Despite the delay
in fully integrating anti-money laundering procedures among non-financial institutions,
48. The Law Society of England and Wales is the professional organization of lawyers in the United
Kingdom. See Andrew Campbell, Solicitors and the Prevention of Money Laundering, 111(2) J. MONEY
LAUNDERING CONTROL 135, 136-38 (1999).
49. See The Law Society of England and Wales, Money Laundering Legislation: Guidance for So-
licitors (December 1999) 5-6, available at http://www.lawsociety.org.uk (last visited Feb. 22, 2001).
50. See Money Laundering Regulations, supra note 38, Section 5(2).
51. See Gentle & Murray, supra note 7, at 5663.
52. See id. at 5741.
53. See Money Laundering Directive, supra note 32, at Article I.
54. See id.
55. See id. at Article 2a.
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preventive steps are being established to counteract the developments in the area of
money laundering. The example of the United Kingdom's laws requiring legal profes-
sionals to comply with identical reporting obligations as those of financial institutions
demonstrates that US legislation imposing such responsibilities upon lawyers should
perhaps be considered.
IV. POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Banks and financial institutions were traditionally known to afford confidential ser-
vices that allow for the concealment of illegally obtained money. The fact that client
privacy is also closely guarded in the financial sector, especially with regard to banking
activities, has not thwarted the imposition of reporting requirements because the proce-
dures are legitimately within the authority of its regulators. Designating financial institu-
tions with reporting responsibilities is the norm among the anti-money laundering pro-
cedures in many jurisdictions and is endorsed by the Financial Action Task Force.56
Placing similar obligations upon legal professionals appears problematic however, be-
cause unlike financial institutions, lawyers are independent professional advisors. Law-
yers place a high significance on the privacy of their dealings with clients and view
intrusions as threatening to the integrity of the profession. If U.S. lawyers are to accede
to having their services monitored, they must first be assured that the professional obli-
gations to clients will not be compromised.
In the U.K., reporting requirements may be in place but the legal community chal-
lenges the provisions as detrimental to the quality of their services. The recent amend-
ments to the European Community Directive stimulated debate on the compatibility of
anti-money laundering measures with the practice of law. After the European Commu-
nity's release of the amendments to the Directive, the Law Society formed the Money
Laundering and Serious Fraud Task Force (the Task Force) to fully implement the
changes that will become effective this year. 7 Responsible for distributing the practice
guidelines for solicitors, the Task Force took part in European Parliament debates on
issues that will specifically impact the. practice of U.K. solicitors. For example, the
European Parliament proposed to limit solicitor-client privilege in a way analogous to
the relaxation of banking secrecy laws in order to strengthen the fight against money
laundering.58 Before the amendments take effect, the European Parliament was consider-
ing the concept of "litigation privilege" which would have limited the protection only to
communication between the client and the solicitor that is directly related to legal pro-
56. See Financial Action Task Force, supra note 2.
57. See Law Society Gets Serious About Money Laundering, MONEY LAUNDERING MONITOR: KEY
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS (CCH, Institute of Advanced Legal
Studies, London, England) July 2000, p.1, available at http://www.cchnewlaw.co.uk (last visited Feb. 20,
2001).
58. See id.
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ceedings.59 The Task Force has advocated the views of the legal community in the U.K.
that placing such a limitation on solicitor-client privilege would render the protection a
futile one because it would only take effect if and once legal proceedings begin, which is
also when the protection is needed most.
60
Although the European Parliament's proposal is only one example of how anti-
money laundering legislation may affect the practice of law, imposing reporting re-
quirements upon lawyers raises similar fundamental issues whether it is considered
within the context of the legal profession in the United States or in the United Kingdom.
Both in the U.S. and the U.K., the confidential relationship between the client and her
lawyer makes the profession attractive to money launderers. First, reporting on suspi-
cious client activity violates a lawyer's duty of confidentiality to the client. In the U.K.,
solicitors are bound by a general duty of confidentiality that covers all information re-
garding the client, whether it is communicated by the client or by another acting on her
behalf.61 Few lawyers or solicitors would risk their careers and becoming the subject of
disciplinary action by a professional association for violating the confidence of their
clients. Solicitors in the U.K. are released from their duty of confidentiality if they are to
comply with the record-keeping laws. Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1993, strong
evidence of a client's criminal motive warrants the release of information to the authori-
ties without jeopardizing a solicitor's career. 62 The common law makes room for a com-
pelling public interest to override a solicitor's contractual obligation and invalidate a
claim for breach of confidentiality. 63 Due to the U.K.'s strong public policy against
money laundering, occasional divergence from standard legal professional norms may
be justified.64
A related concern with regard to the effect of reporting procedures on solicitors is
its impact upon attorney-client privilege. The distinction between confidentiality and
privilege is that the former applies to communication that occurs within the attorney-
client relationship while the latter, referred to as legal professional privilege in the U.K.,
covers only selected information that is protected against disclosure. 65 Since the privi-
lege against disclosure belongs to the client, only she and not the lawyer may waive it
before any information may be legitimately disclosed to a third party.66 For example,
requiring U.K. solicitors to report their suspicions regarding a client is contradictory to
the fundamental duties of confidentiality and privilege that attach in a solicitor-client
59. Id. at 2.
60. See id.
61. See THE LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, THE GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
OF SOLICITORS, 324 (Nicola Taylor ed., 8th ed. 1999).
62. See Gentle & Murray, supra note 7, at 5662.
63. Law Society of England & Wales, supra note 49, at 6.
64. See THE LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 61, at 325.
65. See Campbell, supra note 48, at 137.
66. See id. at 138.
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relationship. However, lawyers acting in their legal capacity are exempt from divulging
information confided to them by clients. U.K. money laundering laws treat privilege
much like confidentiality by protecting solicitors against professional misconduct. Un-
der the U.K. regime, providing authorities with information does not constitute a waiver
of privilege as long as it is performed within the context of a criminal investigation.67 By
protecting barristers and solicitors against potential breaches of their professional
obligations, U.K. laws attempt to facilitate the cooperation of the legal community when
a criminal investigation of financial crime takes place. In addition, solicitors and legal
firms in the U.K. are given safe harbor protection against liability so long as they take
reasonable efforts to comply with the reporting regulations through instituting internal
procedures.68
If U.S. lawyers are likewise assigned the task of reporting against money launder-
ing, their ability to give effective advice may be at risk. The premise underlying the
protection of clients' confidences is to encourage full disclosure of one's situation in
order for a lawyer to offer the best possible representation. Fear that a lawyer may di-
vulge confidential information has the obvious implication that clients may become
unwilling to fully disclose information to their counsel. Regardless of whether clients
are innocent, involved in minor offenses, or outright using legal services in pursuit of
financial fraud, they are bound to act defensively when seeking legal advice. Thus, any
future U.S. regulation that might make lawyers a part of the scheme for deterring finan-
cial crime must be designed in such a way that does not merely empower lawyers with
deciding when their clients' privacy may or may not be restricted.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Financial Action Task Force recognizes the leadership position of the U.S. in
creating effective legislation against money laundering.69 Yet the movement of money
laundering activities in the direction of deregulated businesses invites further action on
both the parts of government agencies and professional associations in the U.S. Simply
extending the existing reporting regulations to encompass other professionals and busi-
ness within the established regime may not provide an effective countermeasure. The
difficulty of regulating the legal profession in the same manner in which the financial
sector has been monitored is in the intrusion upon a professional community that places
a high premium on confidentiality. 70 The only way in which a measure involving the
legal community will work is if it does not significantly interfere with lawyers' obliga-
67. See Khan & Conolly, supra note 1, at 31.
68. See Money Laundering Regulations, supra note 38, Sections 5(1)-(3).
69. See FATF-VIII Annual Report 14-16 (June 19, 1997), available at
http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/AR97-en.pdf (last modified Feb. 16, 2001).
70. See Gentle & Murray, supra note 7, at 5742.
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tions to their clients. A related consideration is that government control of a body of
professionals degignated with the duty to assist clients in their private endeavors may
result in a division of lawyers' loyalties. Confidence in the impartiality and independ-
ence of lawyers would erode and directly impact the quality of advice legal profession-
als could offer to clients. While legislative action parallel to those already implemented
in the U.K. and by European Community member states appears necessary, it is highly
unlikely that equally strong legislation imposing reporting requirements could be en-
acted in the U.S. without a backlash from the legal community.
Formulating new laws targeted at non-financial businesses and professionals may
not be necessary because the Money Laundering Control Act is not limited in terms of
who may be held liable according to its provisions. Lawyers might think twice about
becoming involved in money laundering in the course of representing their clients if
prosecutions of other lawyers are pursued under section 1957. The problem with using
the law as a deterrent in this context is that it might make lawyers hesitant to provide
their legal expertise and choose only safe cases. Instead of entirely avoiding the problem
of money laundering by refusing representation, lawyers must be allowed to remain
independent in advising clients of their rights while also discouraging the use of their
expertise to circumvent established regulations.
If U.S. measures against money laundering are to be made more comprehensive by
including lawyers within their scope, there are some alternatives to congressional action
that may be considered in the future. Since lawyers will vehemently oppose becoming
subject to government regulation, the professional community may choose to become
self-regulating with regard to the money laundering issue. Rather than direct govern-
ment imposition of reporting requirements upon lawyers, an independent body may be
designated with the responsibility of creating provisions specifically applicable to the
legal community. Similar to the work of the Law Society of England and Wales, the
American Bar Association may form a committee consisting of financial experts,
judges, and lawyers to formulate guidelines to be followed by the legal community.
Such a body may conduct a study to determine the level of awareness among lawyers on
the incidence of money laundering activities pursued with the help of their professional
services. As a result of its findings, the ABA-affiliated body may then formulate guide-
lines to promote an industry-wide practice of diligent inquiry about clients' identities
and goals. In turn, lawyers may then be given the opportunity to decide whether effec-
tive representation of a particular client is both wise and feasible. Perhaps coupled with
the inquiry into a client's background might be the creation of an anonymous resource
center where lawyers may ask designated "experts" how they may protect themselves
against potential liability while continuing to represent clients whose situations might
raise some doubt. The difficulty faced by an organization such as the one suggested is in
determining how to avoid causing lawyers to turn away potential clients who seek repre-
sentation.
Another alternative that the American Bar Association may wish to pursue should
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the legal community be hostile to congressional action is to revise the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Although the rules differ from state to state, the ABA might wish
to follow the footsteps of the Law Society by providing for specific deviations to par-
ticular rules when there is a compelling public policy involved. For instance, Model
Rule 1.6 allows for a derogation from the duty of confidentiality if a client is in danger
of physical harm or if a lawyer must raise a defense in the event she is civilly or crimi-
nally charged in connection with client activity. 71 Under this provision, the ABA might
choose to set specific examples when lawyers may be released from their duty of confi-
dentiality such as in the event that a criminal investigation of their client is pursued by
the authorities. A conflict of interest is likely to arise if a lawyer continues to represent a
client on whom information has been revealed to government investigators. If so, law-
yers might themselves be advised to consider whether representation of the client should
still continue.
While these recommendations are merely starting points for consideration, they are
provided here with the intention of raising concern and potential action both on the leg-
islative level as well as within the professional community itself.
Katrina R. Abendano*
71. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.6
(1999), available at http://www2.law.comell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exelmodelrules (last visited Feb. 13, 2001).
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